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‘Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships’ (MASS) has gained a lot of attention 
from the shipping fraternity in the past few years. Faced with economic, efficiency, 
and environmental concerns, the maritime industry is turning to autonomous ships as 
the key to the future of sustainable shipping. “Will autonomous shipping become a 
reality with industry-wide adoption?” is a question everyone in the industry has an 
opinion on. With many autonomous projects in their final phases, the world may soon 
witness the technology at work.  
However, MASS needs a legality check before such crewless ships can be 
deployed to service international trade. Maritime law and its legal jargon over 
hundreds of years have developed to apply to ships with a master and crew. The idea 
of crewless ships disturbs the entire maritime regulatory landscape, nullifying some 
fundamental maritime law concepts. In the light of such developments, this research 
is an examination of some key commercial maritime law concepts namely, 
seaworthiness, shipowner’s liability, and manufacturer’s liability with autonomous 
ship technology, in the context of MASS operations. 
The dissertation argues that with MASS, international shipping will witness a 
key shift of responsibilities and liabilities from the shipowners to the manufacturers of 
MASS technology. This is essentially due to the nature of the autonomous technology 
proposed. The seaworthiness obligations with MASS will greatly differ for the 
shipowner. Such responsibilities need clarification and will see the manufacturers 
being required to take the forefront in the seaworthiness guarantee. Consequently, the 
industry may witness a shift from the traditional fault-based liability of the shipowner 
to the liability of the manufacturer. Thereupon, the dissertation discusses the need for 
an appropriate extension of product liability into the general maritime law.  
The deployment of such sophisticated technology demands an equally 
sophisticated overhaul of the maritime legal framework. 
Keywords: Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships, MASS, Unmanned Ships, 
Commercial Law, Seaworthiness, Liability, Shipowner, Product Liability, 
Manufacturer’s Liability 
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The international shipping industry is often characterized as being conservative 
and slow to adapt to change, relying heavily on established traditional ways. However, 
the industry over the years has witnessed some significant changes due to the tsunami 
of digitalization that it is trying to accommodate. With the advent of technologies such 
as block-chain, big data, and the internet of things, the maritime stakeholders are 
recognizing the benefits of digitalization, pushing harder than before to achieve greater 
efficiencies and competitive advantages that such technologies promise. A technology 
that has gained a lot of interest from the international shipping community, in 
particular, is autonomous ships which are being lauded as the key to sustainable and 
competitive shipping. Once an unrealistic abstract idea, is very much an existing 
reality today. The concepts of autonomy, automation, and unmanned operations, and 
their other necessary cousins- Big Data, enterprise-grade connectivity, and analytics 
are steadily rising on the shipping and maritime agenda (Futurenautics & Inmarsat, 
2016). The Strategic Plan (2018-2023) of the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) has a key strategic direction to “integrate new and advancing technologies in 
the regulatory framework” (IMO, 2019). In 2018, IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee 
approved a regulatory scoping exercise on Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships 
(MASS) during its 100th session. Thereupon, in 2019, IMO approved an initial set of 
guidelines for conducting trials with autonomous ships, validating the industry’s 
enthusiasm for this technology. 
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The MASS technology exists no more just on paper but in actuality. 
Astronomical amounts of time, effort, and money have been poured into making the 
concept of MASS a reality by different companies spearheading innovation in this 
arena. For instance, Rolls Royce is working hard at bringing the autonomous vessel 
technology to the commercial shipping industry with its project ‘Advanced 
Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative’ (AAWA). The AAWA project 
envisages a remotely operated local vessel being in operation by 2020 followed by a 
fully autonomous unmanned ship in operation by 2030 (Rolls Royce, 2016). On a 
similar track, the Norwegian shipyard VARD built ‘Yara Birkeland’ is set to become 
the world’s first fully-electric autonomous containership, ready for launch in 2020 
(Konsberg, 2018). Another significant project in the autonomous ship arena is that by 
the European Commission under its Seventh Framework Programme i.e. the Maritime 
Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks project (MUNIN). MUNIN 
aims to develop an autonomous ship guided by an automated onboard decision system 
but controlled by a remote operator in a control station onshore (MUNIN, 2016).  
 
In the face of all such specular innovations, the concept of MASS needs a 
legality check. Simply put, the shipping industry is governed by maritime law. 
Maritime law in this context is a functional term which encapsulates a whole range of 
international, national, regional, and local laws on public issues such as safety, 
security, and environmental protection and civil law issues pertaining to contracts of 
carriage, liability and compensation for damage, salvage, and rules related to marine 
risks and insurance, to name but a few (CMI, 2018). The basic prospect of autonomous 
ships i.e. ships navigating with no master or crew on board challenges major principles 
of maritime law. The general legal jargon applicable to merchant ships has over the 
years been developed to apply to ships which have a captain and a crew on board. The 
existing maritime law has at its core a tripartite apportionment of responsibility 
between shipowner, flag state, and shipmaster; the absence of a shipmaster disturbs 
the entire regulatory landscape which has the potential to significantly undermine its 
effectiveness (Veal & Tsimplis, 2017).  
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Thus, certain aspects of maritime law will have to undergo significant 
amendments before MASS navigating our high seas becomes a reality.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
The Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO for the purpose of its scoping exercise 
identified four degrees of autonomy in MASS (IMO, 2019):  
● Degree One: Vessels with automated processes and decision support. Such 
ships have seafarers present on board to operate and control the ship. It may 
involve some operations being automated which at some times are 
unsupervised with the crew taking over whenever required.  
● Degree Two: Remotely controlled vessels being controlled and operated from 
an offshore access point. Such vessel has seafarers present on board to operate 
and take control of the ship. 
● Degree Three: Remotely controlled vessels being controlled and operated from 
an offshore access point. Such vessels do not have any seafarers present on 
board.  
● Degree Four: Fully autonomous ships with an operating system capable of 
making decisions and determining actions by itself without any human 
involvement.  
 This dissertation focuses on degree three and degree four types of MASS. 
Therefore, the research is concerned with MASS navigating with no crew on board 
either being operated remotely or with the help of a software/ pre-programmed 
algorithm and a sophisticated information technology (IT) system. This is done 
primarily to consider the ‘human element’ challenge, which is at the centre of most all 
legal issues. 
Based on the above, this research will discuss purely commercial maritime law 
issues surrounding MASS operations focussing on three topics: - 
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1. Seaworthiness in MASS 
The seaworthiness concept needs clarification in the context of MASS. With 
this new breed of technology, the duties under the seaworthiness obligation will 
change significantly. This topic is covered in Chapter 2. 
2. Shipowner’s civil liability with MASS 
The arguments presented in Chapter 2 provide for a good base for discussions 
on shipowners liability with MASS. Discussions under this topic highlight the likely 
shift in the traditional fault-based liability from the shipowner to the manufacturer of 
MASS technology. This is further discussed in Chapter 3. 
3. Manufacturer’s Liability with MASS production 
After highlighting the critical role that the manufacturer will play in the MASS 
operations and the arguments presented in favour of eliminating the manufacturer’s 
immunity in Chapter 3, the scope of manufacturer’s liability or product liability with 
MASS is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology & Sources 
 
The starting point of this research is the idea of autonomous ships and what 
autonomous operations shall entail as proposed in Rolls Royce’s AAWA project white 
paper and the MUNIN project.  
The dissertation uses a range of different research techniques for substantiating 
the conclusions reached. The primary methodology employed is that of qualitative 
research. It mainly adopts a legal normative analysis to evaluate the existing provisions 
using a dogmatic approach; it focuses on primary data such as international 
conventions, existing laws, statutes, and resolutions. Besides this, the topics covered 
are further scrutinized based on the existing literature available on them. Some parts 
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of the research also employ comparative law to elucidate the nuances and differences 
existing in civil and common law jurisdictions in the treatment of a particular concept. 
 
1.4 Limitations & Scope of Further Research  
 
MASS is a relatively new topic. While much academic ink has been spilled on 
MASS, most research conducted on this topic addresses public international law. 
During the process of this study, it was observed that not much has been written in the 
domain of commercial maritime law and MASS. The topics that this dissertation 
discussed are rather unexplored in the context of MASS. Therefore, in order to form 
an opinion and base the arguments presented by the researcher, the dissertation had to 
rely on existing research conducted on the individual topics alone i.e. seaworthiness, 
shipowner’s liability and product liability. 
 
The dissertation considers the MASS technology manufacturer as a singular 
entity i.e. the pre-programmed algorithm developer or the autonomous software 
manufacturer. This is done, in order to highlight the supreme role of the programmer. 
In reality, it is probable that the manufacturing process will require the involvement of 
many entities. As a result, it would be quite hard to ascertain how liability should be 
distributed amongst the manufacturers or hold any one of them liable in full.  
 
While this dissertation focussed highlighting the role of manufacturers, there 
is scope to research the role of classification societies and their liability with regards 
to certifying the MASS. Also, one prominent issue at present with MASS is its 
insurance. The confusion that surrounds the risk associated with MASS operations 
provide an unclear picture of how such ships will be insured keeping in mind the 
challenges discussed.  
 
As has been proven time and again, maritime law is quite adaptive to 
technological innovations. There is no doubt that MASS technology has the potential 
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to transform the shipping industry completely revolutionizing not only its economics 
but also the industry’s social aspects at large. With the introduction of MASS, 
maritime law will branch out considerably to accommodate the very many issues 
emanating from its introduction. Such issues will become clearer with the wide 
adoption of the technology and therefore, will serve to keep the researchers busy in the 
near future.  
 
1.5 Basic Concepts & Definitions in MASS 
 
This section aims to highlight certain MASS operations and unique concepts 
surrounding it, based on the current autonomous ships projects such as AAWA and 
MUNIN. It is important to be versed with these concepts as they form the basis for 
discussions in this dissertation.  
 
1.5.1. Unmanned Maritime Vehicle (UMV) & Autonomous Maritime Vehicles 
(AMV) 
 
Before we delve into the specific topics, it is important to differentiate between 
degree three and degree four of autonomous vessels for our discussion. While both 
types of vessels operate without any crew on board, the primary difference between 
them, as discussed earlier is that one is being controlled remotely through an on-shore 
access point while the other navigates on its own with the help of a shipboard system 
capable of operating autonomously. For the purpose of this dissertation, we will refer 
to a degree three and degree four autonomous vessel as ‘Unmanned Maritime Vehicle’ 
(UMV) and ‘Autonomous Maritime Vehicle’ (AMV) respectively.  
 
1.5.2. Shore Control in UMV & Shore Based Operator  
 
UMV operations are proposed to involve a Shore Based Operator (SBO). An 
SBO will be responsible for monitoring the safe operations of the autonomous vessels 
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from an on-shore control centre. Both, the AAWA and the MUNIN introduce this idea 
by conceptualizing the Remote Control Centre and the Shore Control Centre 
respectively. The SBO’s monitoring and control is made possible with the 
sophisticated technology at his disposal. For instance, MUNIN introduces various 
technologies like Remote Manoeuvring Support System and Automatic Sensor 
Module (Burmeister et al., 2014). The former helps ensure the appropriate relay of 
situational awareness of the vessel despite the physical distance between the vessel 
and the SBO while the latter is utilized for the lookout requirements for traffic, any 
obstacles, and environmental data such as weather conditions. Similarly, the 
Autonomous Engine and Monitoring Control System monitors and controls the engine 
components of the UMV to work as a transceiver for the operator (Bruhn, 2015). This 
sheds light on the extremely high dependency on technology for safe vessel operations.  
 
In the case of UMVs, both projects envision a hybrid of both remote and 
autonomous technologies being deployed initially i.e. a remotely controlled vessel that 
will be capable of navigating autonomously during certain stages of the voyage. For 
instance, the AAWA introduces the concept of ‘dynamic autonomy’ where how the 
vessel operates shall depend on the state of the vessel and the voyage being executed; 
the ship can be expected to be fully autonomous during the high sea stage while during 








Chapter 2  





This Chapter will focus on seaworthiness, an indispensable concept of 
maritime law since the merchant marine’s inception. Even during the times of ‘master 
next after God’, it was always expected that the goods shipped on-board are 
transported on a vessel fit for its purpose. Much academic ink has been spilled on this 
topic of imminent interest for marine cargo claims. Interestingly, no single definition 
of the word ‘seaworthiness’ exists in any of the legal instruments governing it. But, 
the principles of seaworthiness remain more or less the same everywhere. To put it 
simply, a ship to be seaworthy needs to be fit to transport the goods it is carrying, while 
doing so safely in the face of the marine perils that can be reasonably expected in that 
voyage. Though straightforward, the nature of the seaworthiness obligation and the 
failure to provide a seaworthy ship has been the Pandora’s box for liability claims for 
the shipowners for decades. The Chapter first briefly touches upon the history of 
seaworthiness. It then delves into the seaworthiness obligation under the English 
common law and under the different contracts of carriage by sea, highlighting the 
differing nature of the said obligation under such contracts. This helps in 
understanding what is expected from the shipowner in fulfilling the seaworthy 
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obligations. In the context of such discussions, the challenges in ensuring the 
seaworthiness of a MASS by a shipowner is discussed. 
 
2.2. The Origins of Seaworthiness 
 
Seaworthiness has never been articulated properly to the extent that there is no 
explicit definition or reference to the term ‘seaworthiness’ in any of the historical 
maritime codes. However, there is enough evidence of the concept of seaworthiness 
being around since the earliest of times.  
 
In the ‘Laws of Oleron’, considered to be the foundation of all the European 
maritime codes, the seaworthiness obligation was stipulated to be an explicit 
obligation requiring the shipowner to show the condition of the ropes, cordages and 
the slings to the merchant before the loading commenced (Kampantais, 2016). 
Furthermore, properly manning the vessel was an obligation. Any deficiencies in 
relation to such obligations made the shipowner liable for any damages resulting 
thereof. References to the vessel’s fitness can also be drawn from charterparties of as 
early as the 16th century; for instance, in the ‘Charterparty of Cheritie’ dated July 3rd 
1531, the implied warranty of seaworthiness can be found. It stipulates: -“And the sayd 
owner shall warant the sayd shyppe stronge stanche well and sufficyentlye vitalled and 
apparellyd with mastys sayles sayle yerds ancors cables ropes and all other thyngs 
nedefull and necessarie to and for the sayd shype during this presentt viage And the 
sayd owner shall ffynd in the sayd shippe xj good and able maryners”. As can be 
inferred, there was an obligation to provide a ship fit for its purpose and to man it 
properly.  
 
Years later came the body of Marine Ordinances of 1681 by Colbert under the 
reign of Louis XIV. It is considered to be one of the most important contributions to 
commercial insurance and maritime law. The Ordinances are said to have laid down 
the foundation of the warranty of seaworthiness, specifically with the clause: - 
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“However, if the merchant prove that when the ship put to sea she was unfit for sailing, 
the master shall lose his freight, and pay other damages and losses”. As can be 
inferred, this imposed an absolute obligation on the shipowner to provide a seaworthy 
vessel, and any unfitness which exposes her to risks was sufficient to afford a merchant 
the right to indemnity. Thus, the concept of seaworthiness like the general maritime 
law was conceived, nurtured, and shaped by the needs of commerce (Chamlee, 1973). 
It has been an indispensable concept applied to merchant marine since its inception 
and remains one of the fundamental principles of admiralty law in the 21st century. 
 
2.3. Seaworthiness under Common Law 
 
Seaworthiness under English common law is an absolute duty of the 
shipowner. Contracts of carriage by sea usually make an explicit reference to the 
obligation. In the absence of any reference to the seaworthiness obligation, it is treated 
as an implied obligation for the shipowner arising out of the nature of the contract. 
While it is not common for such contracts to define seaworthiness, they usually make 
reference to the vessel being ‘strong and staunch’ or ‘tight and fit’ (Girvin, 2017). It is 
more or less known, what is expected out of the shipowner in fulfilling this duty; the 
principles of seaworthiness have remained the same under the doctrine of 
seaworthiness.  
 
2.3.1. Requirements  
 
The seaworthiness obligation extends to three facets of a vessel. The first is the 
structural integrity of the ship. The vessel must be in a sound physical condition to 
undertake the planned voyage. As was ruled in the UK case Kopitoff v Wilson [ (1876) 
1 QBD 602 ], a seaworthy vessel is one which is “fit to meet and undergo the perils of 
the sea and other incidental risks to which of necessity she must be exposed in the 
course of the voyage”. Structural fitness extends to the vessel’s equipment including 
but not restricted to her engine and navigational aids. Secondly, the vessel has to be 
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cargoworthy i.e. she is fit to receive and transport the cargo she has been 
commissioned for. As was ruled in Stanton v Richardson [ (1872) LR 7 CP ] , “... the 
obligation of the shipowner is to supply a ship that is seaworthy in relation to the cargo 
which he has undertaken to carry”. The third aspect of the seaworthiness obligation 
entails manning the vessel with adequate and competent master and crew. Therefore, 
an incompetent crew or inadequate manning will render the ship unseaworthy, as 
indicated in Hong Kong Fir Shipping v Kawasaki Kisen Kai Co Ltd [ (1962) 2 QBD 
26 ].  
 
A fourth factor which is a culmination of the three aspects just discussed is that 
of relevant documentation. A vessel is required to have a wide range of certificates 
and documents on-board. The absence of such documents can amount to a breach of 
the seaworthiness obligation. Having the required documents is a way to evidence the 
adherence to the other three aspects as well. These documents include but are not 
restricted to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code or International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code documentation, Ship Safety Construction 
Certificate, Ship Safety Equipment Certificate, Ship’s Plan, and Deck Clearance 
Certificate, etc. 
 
2.3.2. Absolute but Relative 
 
Under the English common law, the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is an 
absolute duty, failing which the shipowners are liable regardless of their efforts or 
precautions taken in doing so; as was ruled in Steel v State Line Steamship Co. [ (1877) 
3 AC 72 ], “not merely that they should do their best to make the ship fit, but that the 
ship should really be fit”. However, this absolute duty is relative as well. This means 
that it is not expected from the shipowner to furnish a ‘perfect’ vessel but rather a 
vessel that is reasonably fit to undertake the voyage she has been commissioned for, 
as was ruled in the case President of India v West Coast Steamship Co (The Portland 
Trader) [ (1963) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 278 ].  
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Related to this, Justice Chanell put forward the test of unseaworthiness, citing 
Carver in McFadden Brothers and Co v Blue Star Line Ltd [ (1905) 1 KB 697 ] 
according to which “a vessel must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary 
careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of 
her voyage, having regards to all probable circumstances of it” (Carver, 1982). 
Therefore, the seaworthiness obligation is relative to the nature of the ship, the 
particular voyage she is about to undertake, the expected perils reasonably 
conceivable, and the cargo she is transporting.  
 
2.3.3. Time Period  
 
The absolute obligation attaches itself to the shipowner at two points: the 
commencement of the loading operations and at the commencement of the voyage. At 
common law, the seaworthiness obligation that attaches at the commencement of the 
voyage is not a continuing one. The loading stage requires the vessel being fit to 
receive the cargo and fit to encounter any ordinary perils that can be expected during 
the loading operations. Once the loading operations end with the cargo on-board, the 
obligation ends and the vessel must now be seaworthy for the next stage which will be 
the commencement of the voyage. As ruled in McFadden Brothers and Co v Blue Star 
Line Ltd [ (1905) 1 KB 697 ], “..there is no continuing warranty after the goods are 
once on board that the ship shall continue fit to hold the goods during that stage and 
until she is ready to go to sea, notwithstanding any accident that may happen to her in 
the meantime”.  
 
Also the case Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant 
Marine Ltd [ (1959) AC 589 (PC) ] made it clear that the shipowner cannot argue that 
the vessel was seaworthy when the goods were shipped on board but she became 
unseaworthy after that. The voyage commences when all the hatches are battened 
down and orders from the bridge are given so that the vessel starts moving from the 
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mooring place (Tetley, 1988). At the commencement of the voyage, the vessel must 
be structurally fit, sound in condition, manned properly, and supplied well to undertake 
voyage and face the ordinary perils expected.  
 
2.3.4. Breach of the Obligation  
 
Under English Law, the consequences of a breach in the seaworthiness 
obligation depend on the type of contract, the severity of the breach, and the time it 
will take to rectify it. While the obligation is referred to as a warranty of seaworthiness, 
maritime law classifies it seaworthiness as an ‘innominate obligation’. A breach of 
warranty entitles a party to claim damages, and a breach of a condition may give the 
authority to a party to repudiate the contract. However, as held in the Hong Kong Fir 
Shipping Case [ (1962) 2 QBD 26 ] “the legal consequences of a breach of such an 
undertaking, unless provided for expressly in the contract, depend upon the nature of 
the event to which the breach gives rise and do not follow automatically from a prior 
classification of the undertaking as a condition or a warranty”. 
 
2.4. Seaworthiness in the International Conventions on Carriage of Goods 
by Sea 
 
The applicable laws regarding seaworthiness under contracts of carriage by sea 
were originally subject to common law, later becoming subject to the Harter Act 1893 
followed by the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
relating to the Bills of Lading i.e. the Hague Rules (HR), and later the Visby 
amendments to the HR i.e. the Hague-Visby Rules (HVR). The contracts of carriage 
may also be subject to the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (Hamburg Rules) if a State is a party to it.  
 
Another Convention which governs carriage by sea is the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
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Sea (Rotterdam Rules); it is a relatively new Convention adopted in 2008. We will not 
be discussing the Rotterdam Rules as it has not yet entered into force.  
 
2.4.1. The Hague & Hague-Visby Rules 
 
HR/HVR are crucial to the carriage of goods by sea. More than 80 countries 
adhere to them covering 90% of the global shipping tonnage (Djadev, 2017).  
 
Article I (b) of the HVR makes the rules applicable to all contracts of carriage 
evidenced by a Bill of Lading or a similar document of title. Consequently, where the 
HVR apply, the absolute obligation under common law is replaced by one of 
exercising due diligence. Article III (1) of HVR stipulates- “The carrier shall be bound 
before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to: (a) Make the 
ship seaworthy; (b) Properly man, equip and supply the ships (c) Make the holds, 
refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are 
carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation”. The HVR borrow 
the principle of ‘due diligence’ from the Harter Act.  
 
William Tetley defines the term ‘due diligence’ as a “genuine, competent and 
reasonable effort of the carrier to fulfil the obligations set out in subparagraph (a), 
(b) and (c) of Art III of the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules” (Tetley, 1988). The standard 
of exercising due diligence remains the same as under common law; it has been 
interpreted by courts as the duty to exercise reasonable care in the case Riverstone 
Meat Co. Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd (The Muncaster Castle) [ (1961) 1 QB 
536 ]. Also, the lack of exercising due diligence can be translated into negligence of 
the shipowner as was held in the case Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai Merchant 
Marine Co Ltd [ (2002) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 719 ]. 
 
2.4.2. The Hamburg Rules 
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Unlike the HVR, Hamburg Rules leave out the provision of ‘due diligence to 
make the ship seaworthy’. Instead, seaworthiness in the Hamburg Rules is included 
more generally in Article 5.1 which stipulates “The carrier is liable for loss of or 
damage to goods … from fault or neglect on part of the carrier, his servants or agents 
… unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could 
reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences”. Thus, the 
cargo interested parties in order to hold the ship-owner liable need to establish that the 
damage occurred when the cargo was in the custody of the carrier. At this point, the 
carrier will prima facie be liable for the failure to provide a seaworthy vessel. The 
carrier must then prove that he took measures to avoid the occurrence and its 
consequences, in the context of reasonable foreseeability. It is important to note that 
seaworthiness under the Hamburg rules is a continuing obligation throughout the 
voyage and is not restricted to just at the beginning and start of the voyage. 
Furthermore, while there is a mention of the carrier’s servants or agents, there is no 
express stipulation regarding the manning of the vessel. None of the Articles make 
reference to the carrier’s duty to man the vessel with sufficient and competent crew.  
 
2.5. Seaworthiness under Charterparties  
 
Most charterparties are based on standard forms and provide an expressed duty 
stipulating the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel (Todd, 2016). In the absence 
of an express clause, the seaworthiness obligation is implied. The nature of the duty 
depends on the wording of the charterparty clauses, stipulating whether it is one of 
exercising due diligence or absolute. If the seaworthiness obligation is implied in the 
absence of an express clause, the duty is absolute. Furthermore, the parties to a contract 
may choose to incorporate the HVR or the Hamburg Rules by incorporation of the said 
Rules into a Paramount Clause; thereafter, the duty to render a seaworthy vessel 
becomes subject to the rules mentioned. The time at which the duty attaches depends 
on the type of the charterparty and the wording of the clauses.  
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We will now look at the seaworthiness obligation under the most commonly 
used voyage and time charterparties which shall be the basis for our arguments in their 
application to MASS, later in the Chapter. 
 
2.5.1. Voyage Charterparties 
 
The leading voyage charterparty is the GENCON 1994 form (Girvin, 2017). A 
mention of the seaworthiness obligation can be found in the ‘Owner’s Responsibility 
Clause’ which stipulates that: - “the Owners are to be responsible for loss of or damage 
to the goods or for delay in delivery of the goods only in case the loss, damage or delay 
has been caused by personal want of due diligence on the part of the Owners or their 
Manager to make the Vessel in all respects seaworthy and to secure that she is 
properly manned, equipped and supplied, or by the personal act or default of the 
Owners or their Manager”. As it can be inferred, the required standard of 
seaworthiness is one of due diligence and not an absolute one. The principles of 
seaworthiness remain the same as are under the common law regime i.e. provision of 
a structurally fit, cargoworthy and properly manned vessel.   
 
2.5.2. Time Charterparties 
 
The NYPE 93, though outdated is the most heavily used time charter party 
(Girvin, 2017). The seaworthiness obligation in it is absolute and attaches at the time 
of the delivery of the vessel. Borrowing the common law seaworthiness principles, it 
requires the vessel to be “tight, stauch, strong and in every way fitted for service, 
having water ballast, … and with full complement of officers, seamen, engineers and 
firemen for a vessel of her tonnage”. None of the clauses in the BALTIME make any 
reference to the manning obligation. However, it is stipulated that the vessel needs to 
be “fitted for ordinary cargo service” which encapsulates a manning obligation; in 
‘the case Cheikh Boutros Selim El‐Khoury v Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd (The 
Madeleine) [ (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 224 ] it was held that “in every way fitted for 
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ordinary cargo service” makes reference to the implied warranty of seaworthiness. 
Thus, the shipowner is under the obligation to man the vessel with sufficient and 
competent crew.  
 
2.6. Seaworthiness and MASS 
 
The UMVs shall be controlled by a Shore Based Operator (SBO) from another 
location, obsoleting the need to have seafarers on-board. It is anticipated that UMVs 
ships will follow ‘dynamic autonomy’ and could navigate on a fully autonomous mode 
during the ‘high seas’ length of its voyage, with the SBO monitoring it. The AMVs 
will be having a fully autonomous operating system that will make decisions and 
determine actions itself with the help of decision algorithms and sophisticated on-
board technology. 
 
2.6.1. Seaworthy Software 
 
Ensuring the seaworthiness of MASS would require the shipowner to check all 
facets of the autonomous ship. The said obligation will include checking the software 
on which the MASS relies so heavily for autonomous operations. Consequently, the 
seaworthiness obligations in MASS will differ drastically from the ones that exist for 
the conventional manned ships. 
 
AMVs are designed for autonomous navigation independent of any human 
involvement. This is done with the help of pre-programmed algorithms/ software 
coded by a programmer. Such technology is essentially intangible. This makes the 
practical discharge of any due diligence obligation onto the shipowners challenging, 
except for delegating software maintenance obligations such as that of updating it 
regularly. It is relatively easy to ensure the seaworthiness of a ship in relation to, for 
instance, its hull, hatches, vents, engines, and generator; such things can be visually 
inspected inter alia other inspection methods to ensure their integrity. However, to 
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ensure the soundness of something invisible would be quite challenging as such a 
system cannot be examined for defects by the usual system of codes, checks, and 
procedures. Similarly, in UMVs, to ensure the soundness of the IT system or the 
software which enables the remote operations and vessel operations in high seas would 
need a different kind of expertise altogether. The problem seems more pronounced 
with an absolute warranty of seaworthiness; the absolute duty would be far more 
demanding than that of exercising due diligence or that of exercising due diligence 
before and at the commencement of the voyage.  
 
The traditional shipowner is unlikely to have the expertise for checking the 
software for any troubles. The shipowners in what would appear as the obvious 
solution will delegate external surveyors or contractors with the expertise needed to 
inspect the automated ship to fulfil the seaworthiness obligation. The researcher 
opines, such duties will be delegated to the software manufacturer/ supplier in most 
cases. With the advent of automated systems, suppliers of such technology will play a 
critical role in the ship operations. Such manufacturers would be in the best position 
to check the software for any defects and take any corrective action for rectifying the 
same. Nevertheless, as was ruled in McFadden Brothers ad Co v Blue Star Line Ltd [ 
(1905) 1 KB 697 ], the due diligence obligation is an overriding obligation; shipowners 
cannot escape liability if they choose to delegate the duty to a third party. Regardless 
of who the shipowner delegates the obligation of exercising due diligence, s(he) is 
liable for any negligence by those contracted, and cannot argue that s(he) did not have 
the expertise to check the work of the contracted party. Thus, this becomes a catch-22 
for the shipowner.  
 
A solution to this issue could perhaps be the issuance of Letters of Indemnity 
by the contracted parties to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy in 
relation to its IT system. This may be difficult, but it seems rather probable that 
programmers of the vessel technology issue letters of indemnity as proof of the 
software being in a sound condition before every voyage. Such a practice is more likely 
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in the case of due diligence required at the beginning and at the commencement of the 
voyage since the absolute duty or a continuous obligation will need greater 
responsibility and commitment with more exposure to liability. Offering Letters of 
Indemnity guaranteeing the safety of performance will help the manufacturers market 
their product better as well. This will further eliminate any hesitance of the shipowner 
to adopt such technology, increasing its rate of adoption. With increased dependence 
of the shipowner on such technology and their manufacturers, the manufacturers will 
have to assume greater responsibility. Manufacturer’s expertise and experience with 
their products validate holding them accountable; this is discussed further in Chapter 
3. 
 
2.6.2. The Latent Defect Argument  
 
Another scenario that can possibly complicate legal procedures is that of latent 
defects in the context of HVR. A ‘latent defect’ in maritime law can be defined as a 
defect that is not discoverable by a person of a competent skill and using ordinary care 
(Tetley, 1988). Under common law, the shipowner is liable for a defect which renders 
the ship unseaworthy even if it was not discoverable by reasonable inspection. 
However, Article 4(2) of the HVR exempts the shipowner from any liability arising 
due to latent defects. Charterparties too sometimes exempt shipowners from any 
liability arising because of latent defects.  
 
The use of automated systems may lead to a situation where the shipowners 
increasingly rely on this exemption.  If a defect exists in the autonomous software, it 
would be quite hard to ascertain that the competent skills of the software producers or 
the authority delegated could have found out any software malfunctions rendering the 
ship unseaworthy; it could be an error in the software not detectable or a technical 
malfunction which was not present and discernible when the vessel sailed. After all, 
we are talking about an unparalleled automated system which will be a culmination of 
many other systems (Komianos, 2018). Furthermore, the lack of case law involving 
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such situations and technology would be an impediment for the courts to conclude any 
cases in this regard. Most cases brought before courts that involve latent defects deal 
with defects existing in the structure of the ship (Tetley, 1988). Even such cases have 
not been quite straightforward; the judgment on whether the said defects can be 
considered latent or not are often critiqued.  
 
As a potential solution to this problem, perhaps an analogy can be drawn from 
aviation law, specifically from the concept of ‘Extraordinary Circumstances’ and 
‘Hidden Manufacturer’s Defect’. An Extraordinary Circumstance in aviation law is a 
force majeure situation that forces the airliner to cancel or delay the flight. As per 
European Regulation No 261, an airline cannot be held liable for compensation for 
delay or cancellation of a flight due to an extraordinary circumstance [ Council 
Regulation (EC) 261/2014 ]. A ‘Hidden Manufacturer’s Defect’ is a technical problem 
which establishes grounds for extraordinary circumstances. However, technical 
problems under Hidden Manufacturer’s Defect have to be differentiated from any 
normal technical problems. The difference between the two is mainly whether the 
defect in question is inherent in the normal exercise of the carrier’s activity. For 
instance, some of the aircraft’s components might fail while under warranty and/or at 
an earlier stage of the product life cycle than anticipated by programmed maintenance 
schedules. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) holds that neither of these 
circumstances will fall under the exemption of hidden manufacturer’s defect, as these 
can be expected to occur. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
ruled that only safety critical defects identified by the manufacturer or other competent 
authority will fall under the exemption [ C-257/ 14, C van der Lans v Koninklijke 
Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, ECLI:EU:C:2015:618 ].  
 
Therefore, a technical defect can be considered a Hidden Manufacturer’s 
Defect only if it is revealed or accepted by the manufacturer of the aircraft or by 
another competent authority. 
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Possibly, a condition similar to that of ‘hidden manufacturer’s defect’ can 
apply to the concept of ‘latent defect’ in autonomous vessels. If the manufacturers of 
the autonomous technology have to disclose such defects for it to be considered latent, 
the standards and reliability of the software fundamentally improve; any disclosure on 
the part of the manufacturer will hurt his/ her reputation and thus decrease the 
occurrence of such defects. 
 
2.6.3. Safe Manning Level: A “Competent” SBO and Software 
 
One of the biggest impediments to the operation of UMVs and AMVs is the 
absence of a master and a crew on-board the proposed ships. Many international 
instruments, given effect by domestic legislations, make reference to safe manning 
levels. Furthermore, manning a vessel appropriately is an implied obligation under 
common law. 
 
According to Article III 1(b) of the HVR, the carrier in order to provide a 
seaworthy ship must ‘properly man’ her. A straightforward interpretation of the clause 
makes it clear that a vessel is not seaworthy and due diligence has not been exercised 
if the ship is either insufficiently manned and/or if the crew is incompetent (Tetley, 
1988). The same can be observed in charterparties as was seen in our previous 
discussions. NYPE and GENCON make an express reference to the vessel being 
properly manned. Under BALTIME, manning is an implied obligation captured by the 
requirement of it being fit to receive cargo.  
 
The question then becomes, what complement of the crew constitutes as being 
sufficient or ‘proper’ to make a ship seaworthy. The sufficient manning of a vessel is 
evidenced by a ‘Minimum Safe Manning Certificate’ issued by its Flag State. Article 
94 on ‘Duties of the Flag State’ of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) makes a Flag State responsible for making sure that the crew on board 
a ship flying its flag, is sufficient in number and qualified, taking into consideration 
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the ship’s type, size, machinery, and equipment. The Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
(SOLAS) Chapter V Regulation 14 further outlines the Administration’s role in the 
issuance of a Minimum Safe Manning Certificate. Importantly, IMO Resolution 1047 
(27) ‘Principles of Minimum Safe Manning’ in Annex 2 lays down the guidelines for 
determination of minimum safe manning; it mentions factors to be taken into account 
for determining the minimum safe manning, of which automation is a contributing 
factor (IMO, 2011). Thus, a Maritime Administration’s view on the number of on 
board personnel required is subjective to its satisfaction with a ship’s operational and 
navigational capabilities. If the Administration is convinced about the safety of the 
onboard technical arrangements of a UMV and AMV i.e. that the vessels require no 
crew on board, the minimum manning prescribed for them could be brought down to 
zero. 
 
In relation to the above argument, it becomes important to point out that under 
Article 94 (4) of UNCLOS, the Flag States must make sure that each ship is in charge 
of a master and officers, who are qualified for the same. Fulfilling this obligation will 
be particularly challenging in the case of AMVs. In the case of the UMV being 
controlled from the shore, the question arises whether the shore-based vessel operator 
can in the current state of maritime law be regarded as the master, or more broadly, 
the commander of the ship and whether his/ her colleagues are crew members 
(Hooydonk, 2014).  
 
The word ‘master’ is not defined explicitly in any of the international maritime 
conventions. That being said, the meaning of ‘master’ was always implied in the 
maritime vernacular. The position points to the person at the highest level of command 
of the crew stationed on board (Veal & Tsimplis, 2017). All definitions of a master 
contain expressed or implied elements of “(1) a natural person who (2) is responsible 
for a vessel (3) and all things and persons in it and is (4) responsible for enforcing the 
maritime laws of the flag state” (Cartner et al., 2009). An important inference drawn 
from this is that there is no reference to the master being on-board the ship while being 
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in command. Therefore, as long as the SBO can fulfil all the requirements of a master’s 
role from a shore based centre, s(he) can still fulfil the criterion of Article 94 (4) even 
if s(he) commands the ship from a control centre. However, some States in their 
national legislations make specific reference to on board presence of a master while 
describing his/ her duties and will require amendments (Veal & Tsimplis, 2017). 
 
Not just sufficiency, but the competency of the crew is of paramount 
importance to the seaworthiness of a vessel too. Most cases brought before courts 
surrounding manning, deal with the competency of the crew, inter alia questioning 
their sufficiency (Tetley, 1988). Thus, the question which needs to be addressed is how 
will the competency of an SBO be examined, if s(he) can be considered a master at 
all. The way in which most shipowners exercise due diligence in recruiting the 
seafarers is by examining whether they hold the valid certificates/ licenses required to 
serve on board. Before being certified, seafarers have to undertake the required 
education and training based on the guidelines set out in the Standards of Training, 
Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention, 1978, as amended, which 
needs to be adhered to by the maritime education and training institutes of the 
contracting States. But, the STCW 1978 Convention applies only to seafarers serving 
on board a vessel1. Thus, the STCW principles and guidelines of training cannot apply 
to an SBO. However, it is important to remember that UMVs shall be operating 
alongside their conventional manned counterparts. Therefore, it is only logical to 
expect the SBO to have navigational and operational knowledge of the conventional 
manned vessels as well. The AAWA project expects that SBOs will be master mariners 
with years of seagoing experience. This would be a step in the right direction towards 
ensuring the competency of the SBO. The shipowner may evidence the competence of 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Article III ‘Application’ of the STCW Convention stipulates that “The Convention shall 
apply to seafarers serving on board seagoing ships entitled to fly the flag of a Party except to 
those serving on board..” 
 
 24 
a master as an SBO, by providing proof of his master’s license. But, as was seen in 
Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (The Eurasian Dream) [ 
(2002) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 719 ] a master’s competency is judged in relation to the vessel 
and voyage it is supposed to undertake. In this context, the role of a master operating 
of a UMV remotely from an onshore point is not similar to that of operating a 
conventional vessel; therefore, it can be questioned.  
 
Moreover, if the standard of competence for an SBO will similar to that of a 
master, the standard over time will become very challenging to meet with more ships 
getting automated resulting in the pool of people with the requisite skill shrinking 
(Carey, 2017).  
 
There may come a time when a professional who is specifically trained for the 
purpose of navigating and operating the unmanned vessel operates a UMV. Will then 
the prevailing seaworthiness criterion and competency requirements be fulfilled? 
Here, it becomes important to mention the seaworthiness test put forward by Lord 
Channell citing Carver, in McFadden v Blue Star Line, would an ordinary, careful, and 
prudent owner allow his vessel to sail under the command of someone who has no 
seagoing experience or has no experience in operating such a technology? In the 
opinion of the researcher, the answer to this can be found within case law. In the case 
Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (The Eurasian Dream) [ 
(2002) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 719 ], “the standards of seaworthiness needs to be judged by 
the standards and practices of the industry at the relevant time, but at least so long as 
those standards are reasonable”  
     
In light of the technological advancements being made with the advent of 
MASS operations, it is evident that the practices of the industry will undergo a major 
overhaul. In such a case, the role of an SBO performed by a master or a trained 
professional may become the common practice and such people being trained on for 
instance simulators, may become the industry standard. Whatever the case, there is a 
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clear need to define the standards and training procedure for the SBOs according to 
which they can be judged on their competence. Thus, in deciding maritime law cases 
on seaworthiness whether in common law or under HVR, it will be important for the 








Chapter 3  




With the shipping business fraught with risks, the shipowners become the 
liability nexus for the operation of their ships (CORE Advocatfirma & Cefor, 2018). 
As the primary party capable of including risk in their operations by obtaining 
insurance, shipowners need to be well informed of their risk exposure in order to 
spread it effectively. A shipowner’s civil liability in most cases depends on the 
contractual relationship that s(he) engages in. These contracts can include numerous 
parties including the shipbuilder, the crew employed, cargo interested parties, 
charterers, salvors, and any liability arising thereof is settled according to the terms of 
the contracts established. However, non-contractual liabilities of a shipowner can lead 
to significant liability exposure as well. Such liabilities include instances of pollution 
caused by the vessel, bunker-spills, a collision or an allision.  
  
Shipowners can be held liable either strictly or based on fault and negligence. 
Furthermore, a shipowner is vicariously liable for any faults made by his crew or any 
third parties that he contracts in relation to his vessel operations, who ultimately are 
his employees or agents respectively. Applying such liability regimes to the MASS 
operations poses significant challenges. The idea that an SBO can be considered an 
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employee of the shipowner seems straightforward. But, who assumes the 
responsibility of the software controlling the autonomous ship given that shipowners 
will have limited control over its operations? Can the software be considered a 
shipowner’s employee? In the situation where the software controls the vessel, it will 
be difficult to assess the fault of the ship-owner. Hence, the application of the 
traditional fault-based liability in MASS cases becomes challenging. Alternatively, 
holding the shipowner strictly liable for MASS becomes unjustifiable if we consider 
the rationales of strict liability.  
 
This Chapter is a discussion of the present legal regimes applicable to a 
shipowner and the challenges involved in their application to autonomous vessels. The 
discussions highlight the increased role of the autonomous software manufacturer in 
ensuring safe MASS operations and argue in favour of the need for such entities to 
assume liability. 
 
3.2. Liability Regimes for the Shipowners 
 
3.2.1. Vicarious Liability 
 
The doctrine of vicarious liability lies at the heart of all common law systems 
of tort. The civilian systems generally refer to this type of liability as ‘liability for the 
acts of others’. Principles of both the system remain more or less the same. Such a 
liability makes the defendant liable for the torts committed by others under his 
employment (Giliker, 2010). The master and crew of the ship are employees of the 
shipowner. Therefore, as in any business, a shipowner is vicariously liable for the 
negligence of the master or the crew, and any damage caused by such negligence. In 
most jurisdictions, the word ‘negligence’ or the factors which constitute negligent 
behaviour are defined in the same way. As was ruled in the landmark case Donoghue 
v Stevenson [ (1932) UKHL 100 ], negligence can be best defined as a “breach of a 
recognized duty of care owed to a person who might reasonably be foreseen to suffer 
 28 
loss as a direct result of the breach”.  
 
Discussions of such a liability regime are centred around the principal-agent 
theory; if a principal orders to his agent, the principal becomes liable for any tortious 
acts performed by the agent in the course of carrying out his order (Laski, 1916). 
Where an independent contractor (cases such as those involving salvage where a salvor 
is an independent contractor) is employed to work for the shipowner, liability will only 
arise if it is established that the shipowner failed to take reasonable care in choosing 
the contractor (Baughen, 2012). Also, the importance of control that an employer has 
over those employed and contracted is quite important. Therefore, it can be said that 
the shipowner has a strict liability towards all incidents caused by his vessel due to the 
applicability of the vicarious liability regime (Ulfbeck, 2014).  
 
3.2.2. Strict Liability and Fault-Based Liability 
 
There are mainly two standards of liability that exist in sharp contrast to each 
other, namely, strict liability and fault-based liability. The strict liability standard is 
marked by the belief that a defendant is prima facie liable for any harm caused by him/ 
her with no requirement for proof of intent or negligence. Shipowners are held strictly 
liable in specific severe cases of oil pollution, hazardous and noxious substances 
pollution, and wreck removal.  
 
The second standard i.e. fault-based liability, allows a claimant to recover 
damages from a defendant only where the defendant intended to harm the claimant or 
was negligent in taking reasonable steps to avoid inflicting the harm (failure to account 
for reasonable foreseeability). The application of such a system can be seen in cases 
involving collisions between vessels at sea; such cases lead to several claims which 
frequently end up in litigation (Marsden & Gault, 2003). Collisions are governed by 
the Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGs) 1972. The cause of action pleaded in every collision case is that of 
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negligence and the decision of the court is based on apportionment of blame or 
contributory negligence (Institute of Maritime Law, 2008). Consequently, the 
shipowner is liable in proportion to his vessel’s fault.  
 
3.3. MASS and Liability 
 
3.3.1. Challenges to the Application of Vicarious Liability to MASS 
 
As was conferred in Section 3.2.1, vicarious liability has the principal-agent 
relationship at its centre. While applying vicarious liability standard to the shipowner 
of a typical manned vessel is straightforward, the same is not true in the case of MASS. 
  
A UMV is under the command of an SBO who is employed by the shipowner 
and there will be a contractual employment agreement in place. Thus, the notion that 
shipowners shall be held liable for acts of negligence by an SBO performing his/ her 
duties for the shipowner, makes sense. However, things get complicated in the case of 
AMVs and also when the software takes control of the UMV. Will the shipowner be 
vicariously liable for any damages due to the failure or fault of the software system 
guiding the vessel? Answering such questions involves ascertaining whether the 
software controlling the vessel can be considered an employee/ agent of the shipowner. 
  
3.3.1.1. The Control Test 
 
A discussion on vicarious liability would be incomplete without mentioning 
the ‘control test’. In determining the employer-employee relationship in cases 
involving vicarious liability, the fundamental reasoning used by courts is that of 
‘control’ i.e. whether the employer could control or exert authority over the employee. 
Such a test seems to be persistent in most jurisdictions because it plays a dual role; it 
not only determines for whom the defendant will be liable but also why (Atiyah, 1967).  
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The control test does not prove to be particularly useful when one takes into 
account the modern working styles that prevail at present. In the earlier times, when 
such a test seemed to offer a plausible direction in court judgments, the cases usually 
involved employees possessing no technical or specialized knowledge. Such 
employees had to rely on the instructions of their master for the directions on how to 
best complete their tasks. The technological and economic developments of all 
industrial societies have nullified such assumptions (Kidner, 1995).  
 
In today’s era, employees possessing specialized and technical knowledge can 
make their own decisions and work with no supervision or direction. It is not expected 
out of employees to be constantly seeking advice on how to perform their jobs. One 
cannot expect a master of a vessel to seek advice from the shipowner on how to 
command the ship, even if s(he) is an employee of the shipowner.  
 
The inapplicability of the control test to modern employment is evident. In 
response to this, common law has come to consider ‘control’ as only one of the factors 
in the identification of the employment relationship. Similarly, civil law has adopted 
a more flexible way of interpreting employment relationships. However, scholars 
argue that such modifications and other tests still lead to the same complications 
(Giliker, 2011). The ‘control’ factor, even though regarded as a contributing factor, 
still remains key.  
 
Purely in the context of having control over AMV operations, the shipowner 
being held vicariously liable for the fault of the software does not seem credible. The 
operations of the AMVs will be governed by the decisions it determines itself through 
pre-programmed algorithms and a sophisticated IT system relinquishing all human 
control. There is not an operator ashore deciding the next action, but computers, 
sensors, and navigation systems that make sure the ship follows the planned route 
within its allowed deviations (MUNIN, 2016). So, when does one assume that the 
shipowner has control over the AMV? The idea that the shipowner will instruct the 
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voyage plan to the system at the beginning of the voyage can contribute to the idea of 
having control over the vessel inter alia other factors. However, holding the shipowner 
liable based on this idea is not very rational.  
 
The two objectives of vicarious liability are deterrence of any dangerous 
conduct and compensation for any damage caused (Shavell, 1992). Ultimately, the 
idea in autonomous robots is the use of specific algorithms and codes that instruct 
machines to make specific decisions and act in a specific manner. Any decision made 
by the machine can be traced back to the instructions given by the designer (Lemley 
& Casey, 2019). Holding the owner vicariously liable will not deter the dangerous 
activity because of his inability to change the algorithm of the software. This will have 
to be done by the manufacturer.  
 
There is also the problem of different stakeholders that could be considered the 
potential principal/ owner to the software. There could be a conflict between the 
company that designs, the company that distributes, or ultimately the shipowner who 
operates it. To make things even more complicated, one could argue the differentiation 
between the vessel and the software programme i.e. the algorithm and code which 
makes the vessel autonomous, being two completely different things.  
 
With UMVs, the SBO shall be in control of the vessel and will have the option 
of operator intervention. Therefore, the SBO will be in control and naturally, any acts 
of his/ her negligence shall render the shipowner vicariously liable. But, it is important 
to consider that the SBO shall totally depend on the technology not only for the various 
required functions to sail with safety but also a series of updates related to the condition 
of the vessel at sea; the functionality of the IT system will be key for the SBO to 
monitor the integrity of the ship (Komianos, 2018).  
 
In a situation where a glitch in the software processes the data incorrectly or 
poorly, which ultimately leads to a wrong decision by the SBO during a marine peril, 
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will the shipowner be vicariously liable for the SBO’s fault? The role of technology 
will increase a lot and with that manufacturers of this technology cannot stay immune 
to any liability. Manufacturers will have to bear the bigger chunk of liability if it is a 
defect in the product that leads to damages. This is under the scope of product liability 
which is discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3.1.2. Lack of Agency  
 
The most basic concept in legal liability is that it governs the behaviour of the 
people and that liability can only be attributed to a person demonstrating the capacity 
to act as a purposive agent (Rachum-Twaig, 2019). Even though the software, in the 
end, is executing the will of the shipowner, the software is not human. Scholars have 
however appealed to the principles of agency law to determine how to assign liability 
for the behaviour of the autonomous programmes (Chopra & White, 2009). It is likely 
that autonomous programmes may be considered an agent of the person employing it 
in the future. But, at present, the software lacks agency and cannot be considered an 
‘agent’ or an employee of the shipowner. 
  
3.3.2. Challenges to the Application of Strict & Fault-Based Liability to MASS 
 
Fault-based liability requires proof that the defendant was negligent in his 
actions and therefore any damage caused thereof is due to his fault (Posner, 1972). 
Connected to this, is the duty of care which requires the defendant to take adequate 
steps to avoid any causation of harm, while reasonably foreseeing the damages that 
can be caused through the activity being undertaken.  
 
The concept of duty of care seems to be broad and can vary extensively 
depending on the nature of business in question and in regards to the different steps 
that need to be taken as a precaution. However, the interpretation of the duty of care 
has been kept straightforward in the application by courts.  
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The landmark case United States v. Carroll Towing Co., [ 159 F.2d 169 (2d. 
Cir. 1947) ] . expressed the standard of care ruled by Judge Learned Hand which co-
incidentally involved a maritime matter (Epstein, 1973). The Hand Formula takes a 
cost-benefit formulation of negligence. The formula specifies that a breach of duty of 
care exists if the cost of prevention of harm was lower than the probability of the harm 
occurring2.  
 
The formula has the element of foreseeability embedded into it, which is where 
the challenge for its application to the owner of a MASS lies. While the perils at sea 
are reasonably foreseeable, there is some amount of unpredictability attached to the 
AMV operations itself. What happens if the AMV responds incorrectly on a collision 
course? What is the probability of such an incident occurring? What are the preventive 
measures that are being taken as a precaution for the same? Answers to such questions 
would require proof, which would be difficult to determine.  
 
There is the problem of establishing which of the stakeholders would be better 
informed about the elements in the question and take suitable measures. The 
sophistication of the manufacturers of the programme, their access to data, and their 
familiarities with the programme makes them better adept at assessing the risk and 
taking the necessary precautions. Holding the shipowner accountable for the algorithm 
which failed to foresee a peril and inadequately responded to it would not be fair. This 
would keep the manufacturers of the programme hidden from any liability even when 
it is the programmer who is priming the software for operations at sea.  
 
Assessing negligent behaviour with UMVs would be relatively easy. Fault-
based liability should apply if the accident or damage has occurred because of a 
 
 
                                                 
2 If ‘P’ is the probability of harm occurrence, ‘L’ is cost of injury, and ‘B’ is the burden of 
adequate precautions, then breach of duty occurs when B < P x L 
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production defect in the software that could have been rectified by the shipowner 
exercising due diligence. But, this takes us back to an argument presented in Chapter 
2 highlighting the difficulties of bestowing the due diligence responsibility on the 
shipowner. Similarly, with AMVs, it could be difficult to assess or find fault on the 
part of the shipowner unless the shipowner has failed to exercise due diligence in 
operating the MASS or in relation to maintenance or software updates. Perhaps 
establishing standards of duty of care for the shipowner can prove as a starting point 
in proving negligence. Such standards of care for the programme and MASS 
operations should be set high. If such standards are unmet, liability can be triggered, 
and if met, the burden of proof shall shift onto the claimant in proving the shipowner’s 
negligence and its causal relationship to the damage. Also for AMV, the data recorded 
will have to be carefully examined. However, this might significantly increase the 
administrative costs of the courts.  
 
It would be hard to ascertain the fault of the software and therefore, the 
application of a theoretical fault-based liability may de facto may lead to a strict 
liability standard for shipowners (CORE Advocatfirma & Cefor, 2018). As discussed 
previously, strict liability does away with the need to prove negligence or fault. 
Therefore, with MASS, strict liability can capture the unpredictability of the software 
or any product deficiency without having to judge where the fault lies. This is certainly 
a strong point in favour of applying strict liability to MASS shipowners.  
 
From an economic viewpoint even though shipowners in the face of strict 
liability may face huge costs, they can significantly reduce their liability exposure by 
obtaining insurance. The ability of the shipowners to use contributory negligence 
defences combined with the exceptional safety of the MASS will prevent the total 
immunity of the manufacturers and reduce the insurance premiums respectively 
(Beale, 2018). In the end, it is ultimately the shipowner who places his trust in such a 
technology. Such a decision is economically motivated by the prospects of savings on 
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crewing costs and an increase in operational efficiency. Therefore, shipowner’s 
responsibility should increase as well.  
 
The predominant scholarly belief is that strict liability should apply to the party 
in the best position to analyse the cost and benefits, between the cost of damages and 
cost of avoidance, and therefore has the ability to act accordingly (Garbessi & 
Hirschoff, 1972). Arguing which stakeholder would be best suited to analyse the costs 
and risks associated with MASS operations makes the idea of holding the shipowner 
strictly liable weak.  
 
The arguments presented for justifying the application of strict liability to 
shipowners can reasonably be extended to the manufacturers of the programme. The 
manufacturers are in the best position to assume the risks involved with MASS 
operations and produce a safer programme, thereby protecting all stakeholders 
involved. While shipowner’s ability to obtain insurance is a valid point, the 
manufacturer of the product can engage in cost spreading as well. Manufacturers can 
adopt pricing reflecting the costs/ risks alleviating the individual who is harmed of 
bearing the loss and fill manufacturer’s coffers, giving them funds necessary to satisfy 
potential judgments (Owen, 1990). However, such a step may deter innovation with 
manufacturers not willing to engage in an activity that increases their liability 
exposure.  
  
The researcher opines that, the shipowner of a MASS should be vicariously 
liable with the right to take recourse against the manufacturer if he believes the 
damages were caused by the contributory negligence of the software on-board. Such a 
system ensures fast justice to an innocent party claiming damages who does not have 
to enter into lengthy legal battles with either party on the causation side. Such 
compensation will in most cases be made by the shipowner’s insurer who then can 
initiate a case against the manufacturer through subrogation or a statutory right. Also, 
as can be imagined, since both parties involved thereafter i.e. the shipowner’s insurer 
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and the manufacturer can be expected to share a similar stature, the case can be tried 
effectively and fairly.   
 
3.4. An Analogy to No-Fault Mandatory Insurance 
 
No-fault mandatory insurance is a widely adopted insurance scheme in the 
automotive industry. It is adopted as a means to address the court’s burden in judging 
fault and negligence in the very many cases of car accidents. Such an arrangement 
makes it is mandatory to purchase first-party insurance and restricts the right to sue 
any injurer; the assured gets recompensed for any injuries or damages sustained 
without having to prove fault or negligence. Such an insurance scheme helps to reduce 
the administrative costs of the courts while producing fairer outcomes with all victims 
getting compensated regardless of their ability to prove negligence or fault (Liao & 
White, 2002). No-fault mandatory insurance is in place in many countries such as 
Sweden, Israel, Canada, and New Zealand (Schellekens, 2018). There is a mix of both, 
civil as well as common law States which have adopted such a scheme.  
 
The European Parliament recently recommended the European Commission to 
deliberate over the adoption of a mandatory insurance scheme concerning robotics and 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). The white paper published comprises of five general 
principles: - (i) establishing a compulsory insurance scheme for specific categories of 
robots requiring the producers of the robots to purchase such insurance; (ii) 
establishing a compensation fund guaranteeing compensation if the damage for 
damages of the robot, if not covered by the insurance; (iii) limiting the liability of robot 
producers if they contribute to a compensation fund and purchase insurance; (iv) 
selecting between general compensation funds or sector-specific funds for every robot 
category; (v) establishing a robot registry that will establish a valid link between a 
robot and the fund with which it is associated; and (vi) creating a specific legal status 
for the robots in the long run [Council Resolution (2018/C252/251)]. Such 
recommendations are proof of the advent of autonomous technology and how 
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stakeholders are actively navigating the legal impediments associated with the 
adoption of it. 
  
Similar to the strict liability regime, no-fault mandatory insurance with its 
ability to negate the concepts of fault, negligence, foreseeability, personhood, and 
liability, makes its application look promising. But, there are significant hurdles to the 
application of such a scheme to international shipping in general and MASS in 
particular. Shipping has no boundaries in the sense that ships travel all around the 
world, visiting different ports; they switch legal regimes based on the State whose 
territorial waters they are in. That being said, the manufacturer, operator, and owner 
of the vessel can be situated in different parts of the world. In this context, a mandatory 
insurance scheme that is meant to supersede the general tort system will demand 
unitary ratification by all stakeholders across all jurisdictions. This is a politically 
daunting task and will perhaps require a Convention similar to that of the Convention 







Chapter 4   




The manufacturers of MASS technology will play an integral role in not just 
the MASS operations but also in guaranteeing the safety of such operations. In the 
previous chapters, it was argued that the manufacturers are in the best position to 
guarantee the safety of the technology deployed, whether it is the technology which 
aids the SBO in discharging his/ her duties, or the pre-programmed algorithm installed 
onboard. Currently, a major chunk of marine liability lies with the shipowner. 
However, with MASS technology, the future may witness a major shift in the onus of 
liability towards the manufacturers and an increase in product liability disputes. 
Usually, any product liability claim is subject to the traditional law of torts. However, 
most countries have adopted a product liability regime which prescribes strict liability 
for defective products, supplanting the traditional tort theory. 
 
This Chapter is primarily discusses the challenges that surround the application 
of the general product liability rules to the MASS technology. The discussions keep at 
their centre the European Product Liability Directive and the product liability regime 
of the United States of America (US) governed by the Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
The differing concepts of a ‘defect’ under the two jurisdictions are examined, 
highlighting the bigger problem i.e. the absence of a uniform approach in product 
liability. Also, it is important to consider how a particular regime defines a ‘product’. 
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The US and European Union (EU) regimes do not apply to intangible products. Hence, 
such regimes are inapplicable to the intangible autonomous software.  However, with 
the evolution of autonomous technology, perhaps policymakers need to rethink the 
entire product liability space in the context of maritime law.    
 
4.2. The European and American Product Liability Regime 
 
Before any specific legislation on product liability existed, such cases were 
subject to the Doctrine of Privity i.e. they were solely decided based on the contracts 
in place. Therefore, a defective product manufacturer was liable for any damages 
caused by such a product only if s(he) was in contractual privity with the plaintiff.  
 
Following the system of privity led to cases being tried unfairly and was 
deemed ineffective. Products follow a series of channels to finally reach the end 
consumer, and it is only seldom that a consumer will enter into a contract with the 
manufacturer (Liivak, 2018). Faced with criticism for the ineffective rule of contract, 
the courts moved away from such practice. This was seen for the first time in the US 
in the case MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. [ (1916) 217 NY 382, 111 N.E. 1050 ]. 
where the manufacturer was held liable against the proof of negligence for 
manufacturing a defective car whose wheels on collapsing caused injuries to the 
claimant; the claimant had a contract only with the dealer and not the manufacturer. In 
Europe, the issue of manufacturer’s liability was not addressed until the 1960s 
(Reimann, 2003). The European courts relied on applying certain tests relying on 
existing tort regimes.  
 
Despite the dying out of the contractual privity, proof of negligence of the 
manufacturer was still crucial in both the US and Europe. However, such proof of 
negligence was a rather demanding condition to be fulfilled by the claimant. As a 
result, the US judicial system saw the application of strict liability for the first time in 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc [ 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ]. The ruling 
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was based on the implied warranty that a manufacturer guarantees the safety of the 
product if s(he) places it in the market (Alvey, 1982).  Another landmark case in strict 
liability was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc. [ 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 89 
(1963) ] which discarded the law of contract warranties held in the Henningsen case; 
the court in the Greenman case ruled that the liability for a defective product is to be 
governed by strict liability in torts. Consequently, the American Law Institute drafted 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts which was eventually replaced with the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts governing product liability.  
 
The European courts had a rather fragmented approach in product liability suits 
with each State resorting to its own jurisprudence and legislation in the 1970s. It was 
the aftermath of the Thalidomide disaster3 which led the European Union (EU) to 
deliberate and adopt Council Directive 85/ 374/ EEC i.e. the EU Product Liability 
Directive on 25th July 1985, harmonising the governance of the liability of 
manufacturer for damage caused by defective products.  
 
4.3. The Differing Concept of Defects 
 
The EU Product Liability Directive governs the product liability regimes of the 
EU Member States. Article 6 of the EU Liability Directive establishes liability without 
fault and stipulates the conditions for a defective product. It stipulates that “A product 
is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, 
taking all circumstances into account, including (a) the presentation of the product; 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Thalidomide was a pharmaceutical drug and also the only non-barbiturate sedative available 
in Europe at its time. Marketed as completely safe for pregnant women, it was available as an 
over the counter medicine used to treat insomnia, morning sickness, etc. However, its 
consumption lead to the unanticipated and adverse reactions with numerous women delivering 
babies with serious bodily deformities. 
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(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; (c) 
the time when the product was put into circulation”.  
 
The Directive has at its core the ‘Consumer Expectations Test’ (CET). The 
CET takes into account the general expectations of the consumers from the product 
and not just the subjective expectations of individual consumers or consumer groups 
(Shapo, 1993). Based on the expectations developed, the test reaches a conclusion 
whether the product in question can, in fact, be considered as defective when it worked 
contrary to the belief or expectation of how it should have worked. This test was first 
adopted by the US judicial system in its Restatement (Second) in 1977. The CET was 
subject to heavy criticism for being vague, overbroad, and ambiguous (Masters, 2006). 
Therefore, it was later abandoned in the Restatement (Third) which incorporates a 
three-way approach to the concept of a defect.   
 
The Third Restatement taking a rather mixed approach towards the concept of 
a defect divides a defect into three categories namely manufacturing defects, design 
defects, and defects due to inadequate warnings or instructions. 
 
Manufacturing defects have to do with the manufacturing process itself in the 
sense that if the product turns out to be different than what was originally intended, 
any damages caused by such a product makes the manufacturer strictly liable. 
Establishing a manufacturing defect is fairly straightforward in comparison to proving 
a design defect. While a manufacturing defect puts to question the final design against 
the intended one, a design defect questions the original design of the product itself. In 
such cases, the plaintiff has to prove that the manufacturer failed to take into account 
an alternative design which was available when the production was initiated, and 
which if adopted, would have reduced the product’s usage risk. In deciding the validity 
of such a claim, the courts have adopted the ‘risk-utility test’. The risk-utility test takes 
into account all the relevant information such as the advantages and disadvantages of 
the alternate designs, the costs related to its adoption, consumer expectations, and 
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warnings and instructions given. The reasoning behind the risk-utility test is that risk 
in any product design is counterbalanced by elements of utility, safety, and cost 
(Owen, 1996). Lastly, the product is considered defective if the manufacturer does not 
give reasonable instructions and warnings to the users for their safety. This is based 
on the concept of asymmetrical information and failure to warn. Since manufacturers 
have a better knowledge of the product and any risks attached to its usage, they need 
to adequately caution consumers about any such dangers by instructing them for its 
proper usage. Furthermore, it is not just the manufacturing phase that the manufacturer 
is responsible for; the duty of care extends throughout the distribution phase.  
 
The nature of the defects in Third Restatement has been aptly put forth by 
David G. Owen who on analyzing the three types of defects says “while true strict 
liability has been adopted for manufacturing defects; a reasonableness standard 
properly applied by courts in design and warning cases is simply negligence, wrapped 
in a strict liability shroud” (Owen, 1996). Therefore, proving negligence is still an 
important prerequisite imbedded into the Third Restatement.  
 
4.4. Rationale behind a Product Liability Regime 
 
Is the application of a product liability regime to MASS technology justified? 
The answer to this question becomes very clear if we discuss the rationales behind a 
product liability regime and why it is applied.  
 
As discussed earlier, product liability was based on privity of contract before 
it was scrapped to hold the manufacturer responsible without the need to prove a 
contractual relationship, in order to help the innocent claimant. Thus, the one main 
rationale behind such a liability system is compensation for a victim which stems from 
the corrective justice principles A defendant is required to make right the wrongs 
which s(he) responsible for (Chagal, 2018). This is further substantiated by the EU 
Liability Directive which stipulates that “protection of consumers requires that all 
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producers involved in production process should be made liable, in so far as their 
finished product, component, part or any raw material supplied by them is defective”. 
This takes us back to the arguments presented for holding the manufacturer liable in 
Chapter 3.  
 
A manufacturer is the primary party who is capable of guaranteeing the safety 
of the product he puts in the market. A shipowner places his trust in the autonomous 
technology guaranteed by the manufacturer and uses it. With the complex 
technicalities of the software, the manufacturer of the algorithm owes a general duty 
of care to all the stakeholders involved in ship operations. Therefore, strict liability for 
manufacturers would be the only way to adequately address the risks inherent in such 
a technology. Thus, any damage sustaining user should have the right to take recourse 
against a manufacturer who failed to provide a safe product.  
 
The other main rationale behind a product liability system is deterrence and 
promotion of safety (Goldberg, 2002). This is a rationale that stands to create an 
example out of bad practices and deters manufacturers from adopting substandard 
production practices. If there is a threat of being held strictly liable, manufacturers 
automatically uphold best practices to improve the safety of their products. Having the 
best knowledge about the production practices involved, MASS technology 
manufacturers can ensure the best inspection and quality control mechanisms.  
 
4.5. Policymaking Considerations 
 
Product Liability is inherently a policy driven body of law (Reutiman, 2012). 
The autonomous technology was perhaps not conceivable at the time the regimes in 
question were originally penned down. But, in the light of the potential legal disruption 
that the autonomous ships bring with them, policymakers should consider the 
appropriate changes to product liability. 
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4.5.1. Is it an Algorithm or a Product? 
 
The EU Product Liability Directive in Article 2 defines a product as a 
‘movable’. A movable can be understood as something tangible. The only intangible 
thing that Directive applies to by mentioning explicitly is electricity. Similarly, the 
Third Restatement of the US defines a product as ‘tangible personal property’. 
 
In MASS, the application of the two regimes is possible to hardware i.e. things 
like sensors, cameras, computer systems, and other tangible technology which make 
the autonomous ship operations possible. However, the pre-programmed algorithm 
which has been the source of much discussion in this dissertation isn’t physical or 
tangible. The autonomous programme created by a manufacturer is essentially 
information that s(he) feeds into a system to help the machine (a ship) perform pre-
determined tasks autonomously. The question then becomes whether such information 
can be treated as a commercial product. Systems based on information are subject to 
much legal debate primarily because they lack tangible form. This is the first challenge 
to the application of the EU and US product liability regimes to MASS. If claims 
regarding damages caused due to defective software fall outside the scope of the 
product liability regimes, they will lose the benefit of strict liability and will have to 
be subject to fault under negligence or breach of an implied or express warranty 
(Kraus, 2019).  
 
There has been much legal debate about whether the courts should consider 
any commercially sold defective information liable under a product liability regime. 
Courts are reluctant to hold defective information as a basis for liability for its wider 
implications on the general free flow of ideas (Reutiman, 2012). But, the advent of 
autonomous ships calls for the extension of product liability to such technology. It 
must be pointed out that the autonomous programme is a non-severable aspect of the 
ship. The software programme is essentially what makes the autonomous ship different 
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from its manned counterpart and what the shipowner pays for. Therefore, any defect 
in such a design should allow the shipowner to take recourse against the manufacturer 
of such a programme. Ultimately, it is the shipowner who takes the risk of being held 
liable but any damage which was not a result of his/ her wrongdoing should lie with 
the responsible party.  
 
4.5.2. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Extending the Product Liability 
Regimes  
 
While the EU Product Liability Directive is inapplicable to any intangible 
software, it has certain key advantages that can lead to significant merits if its 
application is extended to MASS. Article 6 of the Directive applying CET may seem 
ambiguous in the sense of what level of safety is a person entitled to expect while 
questioning ‘consumer expectations’. However, considering the maritime industry’s 
experience with the conventional ships for years, it would not be difficult to determine 
the industry’s expectations from such a technology operating in our seas. Furthermore, 
the fact that reference needs to be made to the presentation of a product i.e. the way it 
is marketed in product liability cases, adds to the responsibility of the MASS 
technology manufacturers. While discussing the advantages of the MASS technology, 
most projects tend to point towards statistics on accidents at sea due to human error. 
The MASS technology is being marketed as an inherently safe option promising to 
eliminate marine accidents due to human error. As a result, any accident which is 
caused due to the failure of such technology leaves little to no room for the 
manufacturers to brush aside their responsibilities. Therefore, manufacturers who 
enter the arena of autonomous technology need to tread carefully while effectively 
managing the expectations of the general public and the maritime stakeholders. Such 
a system fulfils the condition of manufactures being utmost liable with the threshold 
to escape liability being placed high. A sense of what is being said here can be drawn 
from an analogy to the autonomous car industry. In 2015, Volvo the Swedish car 
making giant expressed its intent of accepting liability for anything wrong with their 
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autonomous cars clearly stating that- “We are the suppliers of this technology and we 
are liable for everything the car is doing in autonomous mode … If you are not ready 
to make such a statement, you shouldn’t try to develop an autonomous system” (AIG, 
2017).  
 
Similarly, the prospect of applying the Third Restatement of Torts to MASS 
technology looks promising. It would be challenging for a plaintiff to investigate a 
defective product and prove negligent manufacturing techniques or to prove the 
existence of alternative safer ways of approaching the software design. Nevertheless, 
the application of defect under alternative reasonable design could help hold 
manufacturers accountable. Section 2 of the Restatement allows circumstantial 
evidence to be used as a potential ‘end run’ around the reasonable alternative design 
requirement (Schwartz, 1998). Section 2 stipulates the conditions for a defect to be 
inferred by circumstantial evidence as when a defect - “(a) was of a kind that ordinarily 
occurs as a result of product defect; (b) was not, in the particular case, solely the 
result of causes other than the product defect existing at the time of sale or 
distribution”. Therefore, any accident that occurs not due to the negligence of an SBO 
in the case of a UMVs, would be due to the technology installed onboard. Similarly, 
in the case of AMVs, applying both the statements of (a) or (b) can contribute towards 
strong circumstantial evidence for the software being defective. To put it simply, in 
the absence of any other potential trigger, if a MASS does not operate the way it is 
supposed to, there has to be something wrong with the technology.  
 
The European and US systems have certain limitations as well. Article 9 of the 
Directive stipulates that it is applicable to damages to property intended for ‘private’ 
use. Also, the Restatement (third) does not apply to damages to property deployed in 
commercial activities and applies only to tangible personal property. Such limitations 




Also, while our dissertation focuses on just the MASS technology, each 
product in the autonomous product kingdom differs in its characteristics and the level 
of autonomy. In such a context, extension of product liability regimes to the 
autonomous technology while balancing the policy goals and the free exchange of 
ideas would be challenging. A ‘one size fits all’ approach would not be very fruitful 
in solving any liability issues. 
 
4.5.3. An International Product Liability Regime?  
  
The arguments presented in the previous section suggest that the application of 
product liability regimes will increase the manufacturer's liability considerably. While 
this may have its advantages, policymakers will have to consider the other side of the 
picture as well; manufacturer’s protest against a strict regime will need to be 
addressed. 
 
In this context, there is a dire need for industry standards and regulations and/ 
or best practices in manufacturing MASS technologies. With respect to design and 
construction, industry and select classification societies
 
have produced bespoke 
guidance documentation for unmanned marine systems, which is a positive step 
forward (Veal et al., 2019). However, there is still the need to address the other salient 
features of the technology like the software.  
 
Compliance with industry standards and regulations is a very strong defense 
against any liability claim both in common law and civil law jurisdictions. A 
manufacturer adhering to industry standards and regulations is prima facie not 
negligent (in common law jurisdictions) or non-compliant (in civil law jurisdictions).  
 
Furthermore, unlike the extensive liability applicable to shipowners which 
informs them about their liability exposure, the product liability regime is not an 
international one. Therefore, its application can vary quite dramatically from one 
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jurisdiction to another. Also, this makes this arena quite ripe for the prospects of forum 
shopping. The maritime policy makers should consider a prospective international 
product liability regime applicable to the MASS technology. This will help establish 
the necessary industry standards which answer the questions in the context of the 
consumer expectations or the risk utility test. Specific thresholds can be made 
applicable to the manufacturers. This ensures less ambiguity about what the 
manufacturers of the MASS technology need to do. Also, such a regime can deal with 
the differing autonomy levels deployed adequately and cater exclusively to 







Chapter 5  
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. Rise of MASS Blocked by Maritime Law  
 
The digitization revolution influenced by the many technological innovations 
is on its way to transforming ‘the once upon a time’ traditional shipping industry. The 
MASS technology is one which has made a lot of buzzes. The concept that once existed 
in sci-fi storylines is being tested out in actuality today. Many of the autonomous ship 
projects are in their final phases, and the world may witness the technology at work 
soon. However, the shipping industry finds itself in a divide between experts who have 
contentious opinions about on the accommodation of MASS into the lex maritima. 
 
This dissertation explored some key commercial maritime law concepts and 
highlighted their mismatch with the MASS technology. The topics discussed included 
seaworthiness, shipowner’s liability, and manufacturer’s liability in chapters 2, 3, and 
4 respectively. 
 
5.2. The Infamous Pre-programmed Algorithm/ Software and Increased 
Manufacturer’s Role 
 
The research was confined to degree three (UMV) and degree four (AMV) 
autonomy levels, focusing specifically on MASS with no crew on-board. Particular 
 50 
attention was paid to the idea of MASS navigation aided by a pre-programmed 
algorithm/ software capable of making its own decisions with no human interaction.  
 
The general theme of the dissertation was to highlight the critical role of MASS 
technology manufacturers whose liability must increase with the increased complexity 
of the onboard system and its decision-making capabilities. Manufacturers with their 
increased access to data and patent expertise will play a paramount role in not only 
controlling MASS operations but also guaranteeing its safety. With this, the maritime 
industry might witness a shift from the traditional fault-based liability of the shipowner 
towards the liability of the manufacturer of MASS technology. 
 
5.3. Seaworthiness extends to Autonomous Software  
 
The first chapter examined the current seaworthiness legal framework and its 
incapability to apply to MASS technology. The seaworthiness duties for a MASS 
owner require clarifications, as they will differ drastically from the ones performed for 
conventional manned ships. Essentially, to fulfil the seaworthiness obligation with 
MASS, the shipowner will have to guarantee the soundness of the software installed 
onboard which helps the ship navigate autonomously. In this context, the research 
highlighted the high complexity and the intangibility of the software. Consequently, 
extending any seaworthiness responsibility to the shipowner for guaranteeing a defect-
free software becomes challenging. In a situation where the MASS navigates 
independent of any human decision-making, it will be difficult to assess the fault of 
the shipowner except in situations where s(he) fails to maintain the software or update 
it timely.  
 
Taking into account the expertise of the MASS software manufacturers, it is 
expected that the duty to guarantee the soundness of the software is delegated to them. 
With manufacturers taking the forefront in ensuring the soundness of the MASS 
software, the use of Letters of Indemnity is suggested. On a similar note, the likelihood 
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of shipowners increasingly relying on the exemption of ‘latent defect’ under HVR is 
anticipated. As a solution to this, the research discusses the application of the concept 
of ‘Hidden Manufacturer’s Defect’ borrowed from aviation law. Application of a 
similar concept fundamentally improves the safety and reliability of MASS 
technology. 
 
5.4. Safe Manning Level and Competency of SBO 
 
The critical problem of having no crew on-board is discussed as a challenge in 
fulfilling the manning principle of the seaworthiness obligation. The automation 
potential along with IMO’s Safe Manning Principles will play an essential role in 
influencing the maritime administration’s discretion in determining the manning 
requirements. If a Safe Manning Certificate prescribing zero seafarers required on-
board is issued by a Maritime Administration for MASS, it puts to rest any crewing 
concerns.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a pressing need for establishing training techniques to 
guarantee the competency of the SBO or any crew who might be employed for 
autonomous ship operations. While the STCW Convention will not apply to any crew 
not serving on board, SBOs would still need to have the knowledge of it, at least until 
MASS operates alongside the conventional manned vessels. That being said, MASS 
and their conventional manned counterparts differ in their operations significantly, and 
therefore would require different training and certification standards. Perhaps, the way 
IMO envisaged a sister Convention of STCW for the fishing industry i.e. the SCTW-
F Convention, it can put in place a Convention for standards for training and 
certification for crew operating the autonomous vessels. 
 
5.5. Shift from Shipowner’s Liability to Manufacturer’s Liability  
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With the increased role of the manufacturers, the maritime industry might 
witness a shift from the traditional fault-based liability of the shipowner towards the 
liability of the manufacturer for the MASS technology. This idea is reinforced by 
highlighting the inapplicability of the present liability regimes namely, vicarious 
liability, fault-based liability, and strict liability to a MASS owner.  
 
While the shipowner can be held vicariously liable for the acts of omission by 
an SBO, a situation where s(he) is held vicariously liable for the software seems 
implausible. This is mainly because of shipowner’s lack of control on the software and 
the lack of agency/ personhood of the software. Furthermore, taking into account the 
two main rationales of vicarious liability i.e. deterrence of any dangerous conduct and 
compensation for any damages caused thereby, the idea of holding a shipowner 
vicariously responsible seems unconvincing.  
 
Similarly, strict liability is most effective when it lies with the party in the best 
position to weigh the costs and benefits, between the cost of damages and the cost of 
avoidance of the risk, and therefore is in the best position to act accordingly.  
 
In summary, it is, in fact, the manufacturer who fulfils every criterion for being 
held liable for the software, and not the shipowner. Therefore, it makes sense to 
eliminate the manufacturer’s immunity while making sure s(he) does not become the 
scapegoat in every situation.  
 
A regime where the shipowner is held vicariously liable but may take recourse 
against the manufacturer if the damage caused was because of contributory negligence 
is suggested. Also, a system similar to that of no-fault mandatory insurance for 
shipowners and/ or a compensation fund for the manufacturers seems logical. 
However, such practices and systems will need a unified global application requiring 
intervention by the IMO. Also, adoption of such systems seems workable only when 
all ships operating in our seas are autonomous.  
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5.6. The Application of the Product Liability Regimes to the MASS 
Technology 
 
Holding a MASS manufacturer liable will involve product liability claims that 
are dealt with under the traditional law of torts. However, a majority of the countries 
today have a product liability regime in place. Such regimes mostly prescribe a strict 
liability for the manufacturer to protect the safety of the consumers and to deter any 
negligence and substandard practices on the manufacturer’s side.  
 
Though the application of product liability regimes to the MASS technology 
makes sense, doing so has considerable hurdles. In this context, the challenges of 
holding a manufacturer liable under the EU Product Liability Directive and the 
American Restatement (Third) of Torts on Product Liability, were highlighted. While 
applying the product liability regimes to any hardware installed onboard MASS seems 
relatively straightforward, applying it to the software is difficult mainly due to its 
intangibility.  
 
The European and American systems define a product as something that is 
tangible. Also, a defective software is essentially defective information that a 
programmer feeds into the system. There is a general reluctance to hold manufacturers 
liable defective information as it might lead to the suppression of innovative ideas. 
However, the importance of the autonomous programme being a non-severable aspect 
of the ship makes it a critical component of it. Therefore, it becomes essential to extend 
the product liability regime to the MASS technology.  
 
Taking into account the rationales of product liability provides compelling 
evidence for the extension of such regimes to the MASS technology. Also, extending 
the EU Product Liability Directive and the United States Third Restatements onto the 
MASS technology looks promising in keeping a high threshold for the manufacturer 
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to escape liability. That being said, the different ways in which the two jurisdictions 
treat the concept of ‘defect’ points towards a bigger problem i.e. the non-existence of 
a unified approach towards product liability with each Sate resorting to its own 
treatment. This also increases the prospects of forum shopping. Thus, a need for an 
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